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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20021038-SC

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court granted the state's petition to review the Court of Appeals' decision in
State v. Samora. 2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 604 (Samora II). A copy of that decision is
in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)
(2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: The only issue on certiorari, as articulated by Petitioner, the State of Utah, is
whether "a sentence [can] be illegal for purposes of [Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure]
22(e), but nevertheless limit the range of resentencing on remand?" Petitioner's Brief
("Pet. Brf.") at 2.
Standard of review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals for correctness. See State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79, f3,985 P.2d 911 (citing
Butterfieldv.Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992)). In so doing, it applies the
standard of review utilized by the Court of Appeals in analyzing the issue. Id. The Court

of Appeals properly applied a correctness review in analyzing the sentencing error that
occurred in this case. Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, ^[7 (citing State v. Kenison, 2000
UT App 322, f7, 14 P.3d 129).
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Samora II, 2002 UT App 384 is in
Addendum A.
STATUTE. RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statute, rule and constitutional provisions are relevant to the issue
raised on certiorari. The texts of the statute, rule and constitutional provisions are in
Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999);
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e);
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 18, 2000, the state charged Respondent/Defendant Manuel Samora
("Respondent" or "Mr. Samora") with unlawful control of a motor vehicle with the intent
to temporarily deprive, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a1314 (1998). R. 07. On August 8, 2000, Mr. Samora pled guilty to attempted unlawful
control of a motor vehicle with intent to temporarily deprive, a class A misdemeanor,
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before Third District Court Judge Robin W. Reese. R. 63. Judge Reese scheduled
sentencing for September 22, 2000 before Third District Court Judge J. Dennis
Frederick. R. 63:80.
When Mr. Samora did not appear at sentencing on September 22, 2000, Judge
Frederick sentenced him in absentia to the maximum one year sentence, imposed a fine
of $2500 with a surcharge of $2119.05, and imposed attorney fees of $250. R. 42-43;
see original judgment in Addendum C. Judge Frederick did not impose restitution in the
original judgment. R. 42-43.
Mr. Samora appealed the original judgment, claiming that he was sentenced in
violation of due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). In an opinion
issued September 7, 2001, the Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Samora's claims,
vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. See. State v. Samora, 2001
UT App 266 (unpublished) (Samora I), a copy of which is in Addendum D.
At resentencing, Judge Frederick refused to give Mr. Samora credit for the
approximately six months of jail time he served on the previous sentence that had been
illegally imposed. See transcript of November 16, 2001 resentencing (R. 122); see also
judgment (from which this appeal was taken) entered after resentencing, a copy of which
is in Addendum E. Immediately after resentencing, Mr. Samora filed a motion asking
Judge Frederick to reconsider the denial of credit for time he had served on this case.
On December 3, 2001, while that motion was still pending, Mr. Samora filed a notice of
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appeal from the second judgment. Judge Frederick thereafter granted the motion to
reconsider and gave Mr. Samora credit for the jail time he had already served on this
case. SeeR. 118.
On November 15, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Samora II,
holding that the sentencing judge violated due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405
(1999) when he imposed a harsher sentence after the original sentence was vacated on
appeal. Samora II. 2002 UT App 384, ^[23; see. Addendum A. The state filed a timely
petition for writ of certiorari and this Court agreed to review the sole issue of whether a
sentence can "be illegal for purposes of [Rule] 22(e), but nevertheless limit the range of
resentencing on remand?1' State's petition for writ of certiorari at 1.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Samora was charged with taking his girlfriend's car on March 31, 2000.
R. 07, 21. According to the plea affidavit, he had been living with his girlfriend for over
three years at the time, and he did not intend to permanently deprive her of the vehicle.
R.21.
When Mr. Samora did not appear at the original sentencing, the sentencing judge
sentenced him in absentia to the statutory maximum jail term but did not impose
restitution. R. 42-43. The Court of Appeals vacated that sentence because it was
imposed in violation of due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a).
Samora L 2001 UT App 266.
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While the initial appeal was pending, Mr. Samora was arrested and began serving
the one year sentence that was originally imposed. R. 122:3. He served several months
of that sentence prior to being resentenced following his successful appeal. R. 122:3.
Having already served a significant portion of the jail sentence at the time he was
resentenced, Mr. Samora asked the judge at resentencing to reimpose the one year
sentence but give him credit for the several months he had already served, so that he
would have f!a clean break, get this done, start a new life." R. 122:3. Mr. Samora also
asked nthe trial court to waive or substantially reduce his fine so that [he] could instead
pay restitution.11 SamoraJI, 2002 UT App 384, TJ19. Defense counsel stated:
[i]t would be my request on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a
couple of things. One, that the Court would waive the fine. There is some
restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in this case to the victim.
They've - - Mr. Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-term
relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of the
negotiation, he's to pay some restitution with respect to that.
We'd ask the Court to - - to waive or at least to reduce the fine substantially
and - - and ask that the Court give him credit for time served on this case.
R. 122:3-4. Although the state claimed below that Mr. Samora invited the error in
imposing a harsher sentence on remand, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument and
concluded that" after reading the sentencing proceeding transcript in context, it is
apparent that Defendant was asking the trial court to waive or substantially reduce his
fine so that Defendant could instead pay restitution," and that Mr. Samora did not agree
to the increased sentence. SamoralL 2002 UT App 384, ^[19. The state has accepted the
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conclusion that Mr. Samora did not invite this error and has not challenged that
determination on certiorari.
The trial court imposed a one year jail sentence but refused to give Mr. Samora
credit for the six months he had served since May 16, 2001. R. 122:9. The trial court
later corrected this error after defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. R. 11819. The increased restitution remains in place.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 preclude the imposition of a harsher
sentence after a defendant successfully appeals the initial sentence. The rationale behind
the statutory and constitutional protections is to prevent vindictiveness in resentencing
and to assure that there is no chilling effect on the exercise of the right to appeal. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that it would be extremely difficult to prove
retaliatory motivation and therefore requires that "the constitutional legitimacy1' of any
increased sentence following a successful appeal must be apparent from the face of the
record. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In this case where the trial
court imposed a harsher sentence after Mr. Samora successfully appealed the illegal
manner in which the first sentence was imposed, the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that the harsher sentence violated section 76-3-405 and due process.
The state claims on certiorari that the constitutional and statutory limitations on
imposing a harsher sentence after the defendant successfully appeals his initial sentence
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do not apply when an appellate court utilizes Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) to
reach a sentencing issue on appeal The state's claim fails for two reasons: (1) a review
of the decision in Samora I fails to establish that the Court of Appeals utilized Rule 22(e)
to reach the issue of whether the original sentence was illegally imposed; and (2) even if
the Court of Appeals did reach the issue under Rule 22(e), nothing in the language of the
rule or section 76-3-405 allows for harsher sentencing on remand, this Court's decision
in State v.Babbell. 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991) ("Babbell II") does not allow for harsher
sentencing in the context of this case, and the rationale for precluding harsher sentences
following a successful appeal applies in these circumstances.
First, a review of the decision in Samora I fails to establish that the Court of
Appeals utilized Rule 22(e) to reach the issue of whether the original sentence was
illegally imposed; the state's entire premise on certiorari - - that a sentence that is vacated
under Rule 22(e) is not subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations on
resentencing - - therefore does not apply in this case. Mr. Samora argued in the initial
appeal that the claim that he was sentenced in an illegal manner was preserved and,
alternatively, that the sentence could be reviewed either under the plain error doctrine or
Rule 22(e). Since the Court of Appeals did not clarify how it reached the issue in
Samora L the state cannot establish that the sentencing issue in the original appeal was
reached under Rule 22(e).
Second, even if the issue was reached under Rule 22(e), the constitutional and
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statutory limitations on resentencing apply when a defendant successfully appeals the
manner in which sentence was imposed. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Babbell II
does not allow for imposition of a harsher sentence in this case because Babbell II did
not involve a situation where a defendant successfully appealed the manner in which his
sentence was imposed. SamoraJl, 2002 UT App 384, ^[15. The rationale behind the
statutory and constitutional protections applies with full force in this context where the
presumption of vindictiveness raised by the harsher sentence was not rebutted; if the
harsher sentence is allowed, a defendant such as Mr. Samora who is sentenced in an
illegal manner may well forgo an appeal out of fear that even if he is successful, the
sentencing court will impose a harsher sentence at resentencing. The important role of
the right to appeal would be undermined by such an approach. Nothing in the rule,
section 76-3-405 or cases outlining the due process limitation suggest that the due
process and statutory limitations following a successful appeal do not apply when the
illegality of the manner in which the sentence is imposed is reached on appeal under
Rule 22(e). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly applied those limitations and
vacated the sentence in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH
CODE ANN. $ 76-3-405 WHEN IT IMPOSED A HARSHER
SENTENCE AFTER THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE WAS VACATED
ON APPEAL.
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In the original appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Samora's sentence
because it was imposed in violation of due process and Rule 22(a). Samora 1, 2001 UT
App 266. On remand, the trial court imposed a harsher sentence. Samora II, 2002 UT
App 384, ^119.
Mr. Samora again appealed, this time arguing that the increased sentence
following his successful appeal violated due process and section 76-3-405. The Court of
Appeals agreed with Mr. Samora that the trial court for a second time illegally imposed
his sentence, this time in violation of due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405.
Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, ^23. The Court of Appeals' decision was correct and
should be upheld by this Court.
A. Due Process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 Prohibit the Imposition of
a Harsher Sentence After a Defendant Successfully Appeals the Initial
Sentence.
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, "mandates that a sentence after reversal of a criminal conviction cannot be
more severe than the original sentence, 'unless the reason for the increased sentence,
based on identifiable conduct by the defendant following the original trial, appears in the
record."1 State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, f73, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting State v. Sorenson .
639 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1981)). The purpose of the rule prohibiting a harsher sentence
after a defendant successfully appeals is that the rule "works to 'assure that there is no
chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant's exercise of his basic constitutional right
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appeal.'" Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, f73 (quoting Sorenson. 639 P.2d at 181).
As the Court of Appeals recognized, "due process prevents the sentencing judge
from increasing the sentence when that increase is motivated by vindictiveness."
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, ^}9. Due process also protects defendants from a concern
that judges may impose a harsher sentence if they successfully appeal a judicial error,
thereby ensuring that there is not a chilling effect on the right to appeal. IcL. The Court
of Appeals stated in Samora II:
In North Carolina v.Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072,
2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the Supreme Court held that when
resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the sentencing judge from
increasing the sentence when that increase is motivated by vindictiveness.
To free defendants from apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation, the
Supreme Court held that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe
sentence upon a defendant," the reasons must affirmatively appear on the
record and "be based upon objective information concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding." IdL at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081 (further citation and
parenthetical omitted).
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, %9.
Protecting a defendant from a vindictive judge and ensuring that there is no
chilling effect on the right to appeal are at the heart of the due process protection against
imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals. See generally
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. Recognizing that "[t]he existence of a retaliatory motivation
would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove in any individual case," the United
States Supreme Court required that "the constitutional legitimacy" of any increased
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sentence be reviewable on appeal from the face of the record. IcL at 725 n.20, 726.
In order to further the goals of preventing vindictiveness in resentencing or a
chilling effect on the right to appeal, "the burden is on the State to establish that [a
harsher sentence imposed following a successful appeal] did not violate the requirements
of due process and section 76-3-405." Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, ^|8, n.2 (citing
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726). To sustain this burden, the state must point to facts that appear
on the record which show "identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring
after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.'" Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, ^[9
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 766); but see Texas v. McCullough. 475 U.S. 134, 140-42
(1986) (suggesting that there might be bases other than conduct by defendant after
imposition of the original sentence that would justify imposition of a harsher sentence
following a successful appeal).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999) also precludes the imposition of a harsher
sentence after a defendant successfully appeals, and is even "more stringent than the due
process protection

'" Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, Tf73 (quoting Sorenson, 639 P.2d at

180). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 states:
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence
has been set aside.
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or
on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence
previously satisfied.
ll

(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to
the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the basis
for the increased sentence; or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution
and later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which
case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position as
though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence never occurred.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999) (emphasis added). By its terms, the statutory
limitation applies when a conviction or sentence is set aside on direct review. IdL Like
the constitutional provision, the purpose of the statute "is to prevent the chilling effect on
the constitutional right to appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have
on a defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible error in his conviction."
Babbell IL 813 P.2d at 88. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Samora II, this Court
held in Sorenson that the statute "prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal
(Article VIII, §9) from being impaired 'by imposing on a defendant who demonstrates
the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence for
having done so.5" SamoralL 2002 UT App 384, ^[11 (quoting Sorenson. 639 P.2d at 180
(quoting Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980))).
The statute is "more stringent than the due process protection, [and] 'allows for no
exceptions.5" Bakajov, 1999 UT 45, f73 (quoting Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 180). "The
meaning of a 'more severe5 sentence is clear. 'The second sentence cannot exceed the
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first in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their magnitude.'"
Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, ^|73 (quoting Sorenson. 639 P.2d at 181 (further citation
omitted)). The statutory protection precludes the addition of anew element in the
sentence, the augmentation of any element of the sentence, or "an increase in one element
of [the] sentence by elimination of another." Wisden v. District Court« 694 P.2d 605,
606 (Utah 1984). Despite the stringent protections offered by section 76-3-405, the state
fails to analyze the language of the statute or explain why the sentence in this case, which
was set aside on direct review, is not subject to the section 76-3-405 protections as
outlined in the plain language of that statute. The state likewise all but ignores the due
process limitation on resentencing following a successful appeal and the rationale for
such limitation.
This Court has consistently held that any increase in the severity of a sentence
following a successful appeal violates the statutory and constitutional protections. For
example, in Bakalov, the Court vacated a fine which was imposed after the defendant
successfully appealed his conviction; because the original sentence did not include a fine,
this Court held, "[t]he fine the trial court imposed after the second trial undisputably
violates these [statutory and constitutional] provisions." Bakalov., 1999 UT 45, ^[73. In
Wisden, the Court held that increased jail time after the defendant appealed his justice
court conviction violated double jeopardy and the statutory protection against harsher
sentences even though the fine was reduced. Wisden, 694 P.2d at 606; see also Chess,
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617 P.2d 343 (recognizing that section 76-3-405 and due process require that a
defendant's decision as to whether to exercise his constitutional right to appeal "may not
be impaired by making it conditional upon the threat of a harsher sentence [following a
successful appeal]").
The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy, Utah Code Ann. § 763-405, and case law from Utah appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court
require that the justification for an increased sentence following a successful appeal must
affirmatively appear on the face of the record. See e ^ Pearce, 395 U.S. at 766. In
Samora IL the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the importance of this requirement,
pointing out that a fear of vindictiveness and a concomitant chilling effect on the exercise
of the right to appeal would occur if a trial court were allowed to impose a harsher
sentence following a successful appeal without justification appearing in the record.
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384,fflj9-13,19.
The Court of Appeals recognized the due process and statutory protections, the
protection against vindictiveness and the goal of precluding a chilling effect on the
exercise of the right to appeal, and held in this case that the presumption of
vindictiveness raised by the imposition of a harsher sentence on remand following a
successful appeal was not rebutted in the record. Samora II. 2002 UT App 384, ^19. In
fact, the record suggests vindictiveness on the part of the trial court in that the trial judge
increased not only the amount of money Mr. Samora was required to pay as the result of
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the conviction, but also the amount of jail time he was required to serve by initially
refusing to give him credit for the several months he had served while this case was
originally on appeal. Id, Tfl[5-6. Although the trial court subsequently reconsidered the
refusal to give credit for time served, the increased restitution nevertheless remained in
place. In this case where the justification for the increased sentence did not appear in the
record, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the presumption of vindictiveness
raised by an increased sentence following a successful appeal was not rebutted, and that
the harsher sentence violated due process and section 76-3-405.l Id, f 19.
B. The State's Claim that this Sentence Was Vacated Under Rule 22(e)
Does Not Change the Court of Appeals' Correct Conclusion that Due
Process and Section 76-3-405 Required that this Sentence Be Vacated.

1

The State made an alternative argument in the Court of Appeals that the
increased sentence was appropriate because the sentencing judge did not know that
restitution was owing when he imposed sentence the first time. Samora II, 2002 UT App
384, f20. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument because restitution was
discussed at the plea hearing and outlined in the plea affidavit. Id_ The fact that the
sentencing judge failed to familiarize himself with the record or case at the initial
sentencing and instead rushed to impose a sentence in violation of due process and
Rule 22(a) ffdoes not satisfy the lack of knowledge requirement found in section 76-3405 [and due process]." Id. at ^[21. Because the trial court "is charged with knowledge
of what is in the record" in the case before it, the existence of restitution was not new
information that justified an increased sentence. Id.
Like its invited error argument, the state did not raise on certiorari its claim that
the increased sentence was "based on facts which were not known to the court at the time
of the original sentence." Id., ^|20. This claim is therefore not properly before this Court.
Instead, the only claim before this Court of certiorari is the state's claim that the due
process and section 76-3-405 protections do not apply when a defendant successfully
appeals his sentence under Rule 22(e).
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The rule prohibiting imposition of a harsher sentence following a defendant's
successful appeal "is particularly compelling in this state because there are two explicit
state constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to appeal, Article I, section 12 of the
Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution and Article VIII, section 5." Babbell I I .
813 P.2d at 87. Despite the importance of this rule in protecting the right to appeal,
Petitioner barely acknowledges the existence of the due process and statutory limitations
or the rationale for such limitations, in making the state's argument before this Court.
See Pet. Brf. at 8. In fact, while the Court of Appeals based its decision on the fact that
this record failed to show that the trial court was not acting vindictively in imposing a
harsher sentence as well as the idea that to allow imposition of a harsher sentence under
these circumstances would have a chilling effect on the right to appeal, the state
disregards these concerns when it argues that imposition of a harsher sentence is always
allowed if a court utilizes Rule 22(e) as a procedural tool for reaching the merits of
whether the sentence was illegally imposed. See Pet. Brf. at 6-20.
The State's claim that the due process and section 76-3-405 protections do not
apply in this case because the Court of Appeals initially vacated the sentence under
Rule 22(e) fails for two reasons. First, a review of Samora I and the briefs filed in that
case fails to establish that the original sentence was vacated under Rule 22(e). The state
therefore cannot establish that its entire premise on certiorari - - that due process and
section 76-3-405 do not apply when a sentence is vacated on appeal under Rule 22(e) - -
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applies to this case. Second, even if the original sentence were vacated under Rule 22(e),
the state is incorrect that the due process and section 76-3-405 protections are not
implicated when a defendant successfully appeals a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner and utilizes Rule 22(e) to reach the issue because the claim was not raised below.
1. The Court of Appeals Did Not Rely on Rule 22(e) When It Vacated the
Sentence in the Initial Appeal
Petitioner's sole claim on certiorari is that an increased sentence is permissible at
resentencing when the illegality of the manner in which the initial sentence was imposed
was reached on appeal under Rule 22(e). See Pet. Brf. at 2, 6-19. As a threshold matter,
this argument fails in this case because the state cannot establish that Mr. Samora's initial
sentence was vacated under Rule 22(e) in Samora I.
Mr. Samora argued in his initial appeal that he was sentenced in violation of due
process and Rule 22(a). Samora L 2001 UT App 384, ^[2. He claimed that the issue was
preserved; in the alternative, he claimed that the judge committed plain error in
sentencing him in violation of due process and Rule 22(a) by not relying on relevant and
reliable information and by not affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak at
sentencing. See Appellant's opening brief in Samora I at 2-4, 13; see Addendum F.
The Court of Appeals agreed in Samora I that the trial court violated due process
and Rule 22(a) when it initially sentenced Mr. Samora, and vacated that sentence.
Samora L 2001 UT App 266. In so doing, the Court of Appeals did not articulate
whether it reached the issue because it was preserved, or under Rule 22(e), or pursuant to
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the plain error doctrine. Id, Instead, the Court simply recognized that Mr. Samora raised
the same issues regarding sentencing in absentia, due process and Rule 22(a) that were
raised in Wanosik and stated that the decision in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 31
P.3d 615, was therefore dispositive and required remand for resentencing. Samora I .
2001 UT App 266.
The remainder of the decision in Samora I likewise does not demonstrate that the
illegality of the manner in which Mr. Samora was sentenced was reached under
Rule 22(e). In fact, footnote 1 suggests that the case was not decided under Rule 22(e)
since the Court of Appeals noted the existence of Rule 22(e) and pointed out that if it
were to dismiss the appeal in Samora I, as requested by the state, Mr. Samora could
nevertheless have the issue reviewed in the trial court pursuant to Rule 22(e). Samora I ,
2001 UT App 384, f3n. 1. In an aside, citing Wanosik, the Court also recognized that a
defendant can challenge the legality of a sentence under Rule 22(e) even though the issue
is raised for the first time on appeal. IcL The Court of Appeals stated in footnote 1:
FN1. Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Samora could challenge the
sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct... a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."); see also Wanosik,
2001 UT App 241 at n. 11 (stating issues regarding illegality of the
sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal
under Rule 22(e)). Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal
from the sentence and preserve the State's ability to seek dismissal in any
appeal taken after resentencing.
Samora L 2001 UT App 266, n. 1. If the Court were already reviewing the illegally
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imposed sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), footnote 1 would have been unnecessary and
inconsistent.
Nothing in the Court of Appeals' resolution of SamoraX establishes that the issue
was reached under Rule 22(e). The state's claim on certiorari that at resentencing, the
trial court could impose a harsher sentence because the initial sentence was vacated
under Rule 22(e) is not well taken since a fair reading of Samora I fails to demonstrate
that the Court of Appeals reviewed the illegally imposed sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e)
in Samora I.
2. Even if the Issue in Samora I Was Reached Under Rule 22(e), the Due
Process and Statutory Limitations on Resentencing Nevertheless Apply in
this Case Where Mr, Samora Successfully Appealed His Illegally Imposed
Sentence; to Allow Imposition of a Harsher Sentence in this Case Would
Have a Chilling Effect on the Right to Appeal and Would Allow
Vindictiveness in Resentencing.
The meat of the state's argument on certiorari is that any time a sentence is
vacated under Rule 22(e), the sentencing court is free to impose a harsher sentence. See
Pet. Brf. at 6-20. The state apparently wants this to be the case regardless of whether the
sentence is vacated after a successful appeal by the defendant and regardless of whether
allowing the imposition of a harsher sentence would have a chilling effect on the right to
appeal or allow vindictiveness in resentencing.
According to the state, cases decided under Rule 22(e) are free from the due
process and statutory limitations at resentencing. Pet. Brf. at 6-20. The state says that
since Babbell II tells us that the illegal sentence in that case was void and not subject to
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the statutory and constitutional limitations, sentences imposed in an illegal manner are
likewise void and not subject to the statutory and due process protections. The state
claims that the Court of Appeals improperly created two types of sentencing error under
Rule 22(e) and a correct interpretation of the rule and Babbell II requires that the due
process and statutory limitations do not apply when any sentencing error is reached on
appeal under Rule 22(e). Pet. Brf. at 6-20.
A review of Rule 22(e) and case law demonstrates, however, that the state is
incorrect since (1) the rule itself recognizes two types of sentencing error, (2) Babbell II
does not allow for harsher sentencing after a defendant successfully appeals a sentence
that was imposed in an illegal manner, and (3) the due process and section 76-3-405
rationale for precluding a harsher sentence following a successful appeal applies with full
force in the circumstances of this case.
(a) The Plain Language of Rule 22(e) Recognizes Two Types of Sentences
that Can Be Corrected at Any Time.
As a preliminary matter, the state incorrectly argues that the Court of Appeals
improperly created two types of Rule 22(e) sentencing error in this case. A review of the
language of Rule 22(e) establishes that the plain language of the rule, not the decision of
the Court of Appeals, recognizes two types of sentencing error, both of which are
egregious enough to warrant correction at any time. Because the plain language of the
rule acknowledges two types of sentencing error that can be reached at any time, treating
illegal sentences distinctly from sentences imposed in an illegal manner is consistent with
20

the rule.
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "[t]he court may correct
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e). This rule allows the trial court to reassume jurisdiction to correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner, regardless of the
passage of time. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825 (Utah
1932). The rule also allows a criminal defendant to challenge the legality of his sentence
on appeal even if the issue was not raised below. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah
1995). To challenge a sentence under Rule 22(e) on appeal, however, a timely filed
appeal must be in place. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a); Glezos v. Frontier Inv.. 896 P.2d
1230, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (a timely notice of appeal must be filed for an appellate
court to have jurisdiction to review a case); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436
(Utah 1982) (appellate court "lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal if a notice of appeal
was not timely filed").2
2

The state contends, without support, that the decision in Samora II "likely
abrogates the ordinary requirements for filing a timely notice of appeal" (Pet. Brf. at 5,
14) and suggests that a defendant can challenge sentencing error in an appellate court
under Rule 22(e) "even though he does not file a notice of appeal." Pet. Brf. at 13. This
is incorrect. A timely notice of appeal is required for an appellate court to have
jurisdiction to review a judgment in a criminal case. See Bowen. 656 P.2d at 436. While
Rule 22(e) does allow a trial court to reassume jurisdiction in a case in which it imposed
sentence, nothing in the rule or Utah decisions suggests that Rule 22(e) creates
jurisdiction in an appellate court that never had jurisdiction over a case simply because a
defendant filed a Rule 22(e) motion in the appellate court.
Additionally, even if this were the case, there is nothing in Samora II or the issue
before this Court on certiorari in this case that creates such jurisdiction. The Court of
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By its plain language, Rule 22(e) allows a challenge not only to an illegal
sentence, but also to a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner. Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e)(emphasis added). An illegal sentence is a sentence that does not conform to the
sentence that is authorized by statute. See e,g. State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah
1989) ("Babbelll") (sentence was illegal where court did not impose statutorily
mandated minimum mandatory prison sentence). A sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, on the other hand, is a sentence that is within statutory limits, but which is
imposed in a manner that violates a defendant's rights or which is based on erroneous
information. See State v. Headlev, 2002 UT App 58 n.2 (unpublished) (citing inter alia

Appeals had jurisdiction in Samora I and Samora II because Mr. Samora filed timely
notices of appeal from the first and second judgments; according to the state, the Court of
Appeals then used Rule 22(e) as the procedure that made review appropriate in the
absence of preservation below. Since Samora II does not indicate that Rule 22(e) creates
appellate jurisdiction, the state's discussion of that claim is not pertinent. Nor is the
state's claim that using Rule 22(e) in an appellate court to review sentencing error
necessarily included in the issue raised by the state in its petition for certiorari.
Moreover, assuming for the purposes of argument that the state is correct that
appellate review under Rule 22(e) creates appellate jurisdiction and "likely abrogates the
ordinary requirements for filing a timely notice of appeal" (Pet. Brf. at 5, 13), that
concern should have been addressed in Brooks, 908 P.2d 856. In Brooks., this Court held
that an appellate court has "the authority under rule 22(e) to address a claim of an illegal
sentence for the first time on appeal." Id. Nothing in Samora II expands on Brooks to
allow an appellate court to assume jurisdiction based solely on Rule 22(e). To the extent
the state is correct that allowing an appellate court to address a sentencing claim raised
for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e) also creates appellate jurisdiction without
requiring a timely notice of appeal, that determination was already made in Brooks and is
not properly before the Court on certiorari in this case.
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Government of the V.I, v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 299 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); State v.
McNellis, 546 A.2d 292, 305-06 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988); State v. Sieler . 554 N.W.2d
477, 479 (S.D. 1996)). A copy ofHeadlev is in Addendum G.
As the Court of Appeals noted in Headley, many jurisdictions have recognized
this distinction between an illegal sentence and a sentence that was imposed in an illegal
manner. Headlev, 2002 UT App 58 n. 2, citing inter alia Martinez. 239 F.3d at 299 n. 3;
McNellis, 546 A.2d at 305-06. In Martinez, the Court articulated the distinction between
an illegal sentence and a sentence imposed in an illegal manner as follows:
"'Illegal sentences are essentially only those which exceed the
relevant statutory maximum limits or violate double jeopardy or are
ambiguous or internally contradictory. Sentences imposed in an illegal
manner are within the relevant statutory limits but are imposed in a way
which violates defendant's right, under Rule 32, to be addressed personally
at sentencing or to speak in mitigation of punishment, or his statutory right
to be asked about his prior convictions ,in a proceeding to impose an
enhanced sentence in a narcotics convictions or his right to be sentenced by
a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the
record . . . . "
Martinez, 239 F.3d at 299 n.3 (quoting inter alia 8A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
P35.03[2](2ded. 1987)).
The Court made a similar distinction between "illegal sentences" and sentences
that are imposed in an illegal manner11 in McNellis, 546 A.2d at 305-06.
An "illegal sentence" is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant
statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double
jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.
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. . . Sentences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being
"within the relevant statutory limits b u t . . . imposed in a way which
violates defendant's right... to be addressed personally at sentencing and
to speak in mitigation of punishment... or his right to be sentenced by a
judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the
record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement
promises . . . . "
Id. (further citation omitted).3

3

Petitioner claims that the interpretation of the phrase sentence imposed in an
illegal manner by other jurisdictions should be viewed with caution because many other
rules containing that language have a time limit on the ability to review a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner whereas Utah does not. Pet. Brf. at 12 n. 7. While the state
is correct that many other jurisdictions limit the period of time in which a defendant can
challenge a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, such limitation does not impact on the
meaning of the phrase.
Additionally, in most states, the time period for attacking a sentence that was
imposed in an illegal manner extends beyond the first right of appeal. See e.g. Ark. Code
Ann. § 6-90-111 (West 2001) (sentence imposed in an illegal manner can be corrected
withint sixty days after receipt of mandate following appeal); S.D. Codified Laws § 23 A31-1 (West 2002)(court may correct sentence imposed in an illegal manner within 120
days after receipt of remittitur following appeal). Indeed, the Arkansas and South
Dakota statutes relied on by the state allow a defendant to challenge a sentence imposed
in an illegal manner until a period of time after the case has been remitted from appeal.

14
This means that in both those states and many others, a defendant can challenge a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner while the case is on appeal even if the issue was
not raised below. In other words, review of the illegally imposed sentence would be
available in the procedural context of this case. Because statutes in other states also
allow for a lengthy period of time in which to challenge a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, the state's claim that the more limited time frame for challenging an illegally
imposed sentence in those states somehow changes the meaning of the term is not
persuasive.
The definition of sentence imposed in an illegal manner used by other
jurisdictions is the only logical meaning for that phrase; by its plain language, this phrase
refers to the method by which the sentence is imposed. The state has not offered a
plausible definition other than the one embraced by other jurisdictions which is apparent
from the plain language of the rule.
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The definition for sentences imposed in an illegal manner employed by other
courts and Moore's Federal Practice is consistent with the plain language of Rule 22(e).
Utah's rule, by its very language, allows a challenge not only to "illegal sentences," but
also to "sentence[s] imposed in an illegal manner." The use of this distinct terminology,
"sentence imposed in an illegal manner," necessarily indicates that defendants can use
Rule 22(e) to challenge more than just sentences that do not comply with the statutory
authorization. In fact, the word "manner" refers to "a way or method in which something
is done or happens; mode or fashion of procedure." Webster's New World College
Dictionary 875 (4th ed. 1999). The plain language of Rule 22(e) tells us then that a court
can correct a sentence which is imposed by an illegal method or procedure at any time.
A sentence which is imposed in violation of Rule 22(a) because the defendant or
defense counsel is not afforded the opportunity to address information relevant to
sentencing is a sentence imposed using an illegal method, i.e. in an illegal manner. See
generally Headley, 2002 UT App 58 n. 2 (recognizing that "[o]ther jurisdictions have
defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights"), A sentence imposed in violation
of due process because the court improperly sentenced the defendant in absentia or
because the sentencing court did not rely on relevant and reliable information is likewise
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. See generally id. Such an approach is
consistent with the plain language of the rule as well as the definition employed by other
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jurisdictions.4
Because the plain language of Rule 22(e) makes a distinction between illegal
sentences and sentences imposed in an illegal manner, the state's claim that the Court of
Appeals created a new class of sentences is incorrect. The rule itself acknowledges two
types of unlawful sentences - - those that are illegal because they are not statutorily
authorized and those that are imposed in an illegal manner. Moreover, the rule allows
4

The state devotes much of its brief to a discussion of what it calls "ordinary
sentencing error" as opposed to "Rule 22(e) sentencing error," and suggests that the
Court of Appeals has improperly expanded the scope of "Rule 22(e) sentencing error" in
a variety of cases . Pet. Brf. at 6-20. The issue on certiorari in this case is not whether
the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the reach of Rule 22(e) in other cases, but whether
the Court correctly concluded that if Rule 22(e) is used on appeal to reach a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, the limitations of due process and section 76-3-405
preclude imposition of a harsher sentence on remand.
Rule 22(e) is a means by which the court is allowed to proceed in a case. It allows
an appellate court to vacate an illegal sentence or a sentence that was imposed in an
illegal manner when the case is before it on appeal. In either case, the rule allows a court
to correct an error in sentencing that is of sufficient magnitude that the interests of
society as well as the interests of the defendant are served by vacating the sentence.
The state also suggests, without any support, that the only sentences that should be
reviewed under Rule 22(e) are those which are apparent without a review of the record.
Pet. Brf. at 11-12 and n. 6 & 7. While this Court recognized in State v. Telford . 2002
UT 51,1J5, 48 P.3d 228 that n[t]he purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow the correction of
manifestly illegal sentences," it did not define manifestly illegal sentences as those that
are apparent without reviewing the record. A manifestly illegal sentence is simply a
sentence that is plainly, clearly, or evidently illegal. See Webster's New College
Dictionary 875. Nothing in the rule or this Court's opinions suggest that the reach of
Rule 22(e) is limited to sentences whose illegality is apparent without reviewing the
record. Indeed, a review of the record is necessary to determine whether an illegal
sentence that is not statutorily authorized was imposed, as was the case in Babbell II.
Moreover, a review of the record would be necessary in almost any case where there is a
claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Because the plain language of
the rule applies to sentences imposed in an illegal manner, the state's claim that review of
the record is not allowed under the rule is not persuasive.
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either type of unlawful sentence to be vacated at any time. While sentences that are not
authorized by statute are void because the court did not have the authority to enter them,
sentences imposed in an illegal manner are, on their face lawful, but can be vacated if a
court determines that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner.
(b) Babbell //Does Not Resolve the Issue of Whether a Trial Judge Can
Impose a Harsher Sentence After a Defendant Successfully Appeals a
Sentence that Was Imposed in an Illegal Manner.
Although the state engages in a lengthy discussion of sentencing error as well the
state's perceived concern that the Court of Appeals has extended the reach of Rule 22(e),
its argument on certiorari is based primarily on BabbelllL 813 P.2d 86. As the Court of
Appeals pointed out, however, the state's reliance on Babbell II "is misplaced."
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, ^[15. Babbell II does not resolve the issue in this case
because it did not involve circumstances where a defendant successfully appealed a
sentence that the trial court had imposed in an illegal manner.
Babbell originally appealed his conviction on grounds unrelated to his sentence.
See Babbell L 770 P.2d 987. During oral argument in the original appeal, the state
brought up the fact that Babbell had not been sentenced as prescribed by statute. I d . at
993-94. The state pointed out and this Court agreed that the statute required the
imposition of a minimum mandatory prison sentence. Id. Because the sentences that had
been imposed were not authorized by statute, this Court vacated the sentences. ML. at
994. On remand, the trial court imposed the statutorily authorized, and harsher,
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minimum mandatory sentences. Babbell II. 813 P.2d at 86.
After the harsher sentences were imposed on remand, Babbell again appealed,
arguing that due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 prohibited the imposition of a
harsher sentence. Babbell II, 813 P.2d at 87. This Court disagreed, pointing out in part
that the initial sentences were illegal sentences because they were not authorized by
statute and that the illegal sentences were therefore void. IdL at 87-88. The
characterization of illegal sentences as void and therefore not subject to due process and
section 76-3-504 limitations apparently planted the seed for the state's current argument
that a sentence imposed in an illegal manner is also void and not subject to statutory and
due process limitations. A complete reading of Babbell II, section 76-3-405, case law
outlining the due process limitation on increased resentencing following a successful
appeal, and common sense demonstrate that the state is incorrect, and that when a
defendant successfully appeals a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and relies on
Rule 22(e) to reach the issue, the trial court is precluded by constitutional and statutory
protections from imposing a harsher sentence at resentencing.
In Babbell IL this Court recognized the due process and section 76-3-405
limitations on imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals a
conviction or sentence. This Court stated that "[w]hen a criminal defendant successfully
appeals a conviction or sentence, § 76-3-405 prohibits imposition of a new and harsher
sentence based on the same conduct." Babbell II. 813 P.2d at 87 (emphasis added). This
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Court also indicated that prohibiting the imposition of a harsher sentence after a
defendant successfully appeals "is appropriate because federal 'due process of law . . .
requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new [sentencing].'" Id.
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725). This Court further explained that federal due process
and the importance of the state constitutional right of criminal defendants to appeal
require that a harsher sentence not be imposed following a reversal on appeal.
In State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981), this Court held
that federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from being imposed in
a second trial for the same offense after a reversal of the first conviction.
That constitutional policy is particularly compelling in this state because
there are two explicit state constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to
appeal, Article I, section 12 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah
Constitution and Article VIII, section 5. A defendant's constitutional right
to appeal is further protected by § 76-3-405. The purpose behind these
provisions is to prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right to
appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a
defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible error in his
conviction. This Court has stated:
The purpose of an appeal is to promote justice by ferreting
out erroneous judgments. The purpose is not promoted by imposing
on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk
that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence for having done so.
An erroneous judgment of convictions is as much an affront to
society's interest in the fair administration of justice as it is an
individual's rights.
Chess v. Smith, 617 P. 2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980).
BabbellIL813P.2dat88.
Although imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals
his sentence violates due process and section 76-3-405, it did not violate due process or
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the statute in Babbell II because the defendant did not successfully appeal his sentence.
Instead, this Court recognized while the case was on appeal that an illegal sentence
which was more lenient than that which was mandated by statute had been imposed, and
vacated that illegal sentence. This Court reasoned in Babbell II that section 76-3-405
and due process were not violated by the imposition of a harsher sentence because there
was no chilling effect on the right to appeal and the illegal sentence was not authorized
by statute and was therefore void. Babbell II, 813 P.2d at 88.
Nevertheless, the principles underlying Sorenson, Chess, Pearce,
and § 76-3-405 have no application in this case. The correction of an
illegal sentence stands on a different footing from the correction of an error
of conviction. First, a defendant is not likely to appeal a sentence that is
unlawfully lenient, and there is, therefore, minimal chilling effect on the
right to appeal.
Second, § 77-35-22(e) specifically provides that because an illegal
sentence is void, a trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.
Id
The facts in Samora II are substantially different from those in Babbell II. First,
Babbell did not successfully appeal in the original appeal; instead, this Court discovered
while the case was on appeal that the sentence which had been imposed had no legal
effect because it was not authorized by statute. By contrast, Mr. Samora successfully
appealed the manner in which his sentence was imposed and received a new sentencing
hearing because his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Second, the sentence in
Babbell II was illegal and void because it was not a sentence that the trial court was
authorized by statute to impose. The sentence had no legal effect and this Court
30

therefore correctly concluded that it was a void sentence because the trial judge did not
have the authority to impose it. By contrast, the sentence imposed in this case was
authorized by statute and the sentencing court had the power to impose it; the problem
with the original sentence in this case was that the judge used an unlawful manner or
method in imposing sentence.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, allowing a harsher sentence in this case
would create a chilling effect on the right to appeal and allow vindictiveness in
resentencing after a defendant prevails on appeal whereas none of the purposes served by
the due process and section 76-3-405 limitations on resentencing would have been
served by requiring the trial court to not impose the statutorily required, albeit harsher,
sentence in Babbell II. See Babbell II, 813 P.2d at 88. If the trial court is permitted to
impose a harsher sentence after a criminal defendant successfully appeals a sentence that
was imposed in an unlawful manner, defendants like Mr. Samora who are sentenced in
violation of due process and Rule 22(a) will not appeal for fear the trial judge will
impose an even harsher sentence following a successful appeal. Sentencing courts could
ignore the constitutional and statutory requirements for a full and fair sentencing hearing,
but defendants would not appeal for fear the judge would act vindictively and impose a
harsher sentence following a successful appeal. The appellate purpose of ferreting out
erroneous judgments in which sentences were imposed in an illegal manner would be
undermined if judges were given free rein to impose a harsher sentence after the
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defendant successfully appeals the manner in which the sentence is imposed. Due
process and section 76-3-405 therefore prohibit the imposition of a harsher sentence after
a defendant successfully appeals the unlawful manner in which the sentence was
imposed.
In addition to disregarding the due process and statutory protections, the state also
disregards this Court's recognition in Babbell II that resentencing more harshly might
violate due process even in circumstances where the original sentence was void because
it was not authorized by statute. Babbell IL 813 P.2d at 88. After holding in Babbell II
that due process and section 76-3-405 did not preclude the imposition of a harsher
sentence because the original illegal sentence was void, this Court stated, "[nevertheless,
we acknowledge that 'there may be circumstances under which even a corrected illegal
sentence may be fundamentally unfair, thus violative of Due Process."' IdL_ (quoting
State v. Delmondo. 696 P.2d 344, 346 (Ha. 1985)). It would be fundamentally unfair to
allow a harsher sentence in this case after Mr. Samora was forced to successfully appeal
his original sentence in order to obtain a full and fair sentencing hearing.
(c) The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that Due Process and Section
76-3-405 Preclude the Imposition of a Harsher Sentence After a Defendant
Successfully Appeals the Original Sentence that Was Imposed in an Illegal
Manner.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals recognized that Babbell II was not
applicable and that due process and section 76-3-405 required that the trial court not
impose a harsher sentence after Mr. Samora successfully appealed his original sentence.
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Samora IL 2002 UT App 384,1J16. The Court of Appeals stated:
In Babbell [II], the defendant was sentenced to a term less than the
applicable statute's minimum mandatory requirements. 813 P.2d at 86.
The supreme court concluded that the principles underlying Pearce,
Sorenson, Chess, and section 76-3-405 did not apply because a defendant is
unlikely to appeal a sentence that is unlawfully lenient, so there is a
"minimal chilling effect on the right to appeal.ff 813 P.2d at 88. Unlike
Babbell [II], Defendant's resentencing did not result from an original
sentence contrary to statutory minimum mandatory requirements. Rather,
Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he was sentenced in
absentia. The sentence itself was not illegal, but the manner in which it
was imposed was contrary to the law. Furthermore, allowing a harsher
sentence when the original sentence was imposed in an illegal manner
would have a "chilling effect on the right to appeal," id., and impair the
Utah Constitution's guaranty of the right to appeal. See Sorenson, 639
P.2d at 181. Therefore, because Babbell [II] is not applicable, we
conclude that the due process discussion in Pearce, Sorenson, and Chess
require us to apply the presumption of vindictiveness.
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, ^[16. This decision is consistent with the language of
Rule 22(e) and section 76-3-405 and furthers the policy behind the due process and
statutory limitations on resentencing following a successful appeal.
Nothing in the language of Rule 22(e) or section 76-3-405 suggests that when a
defendant successfully appeals the manner in which his sentence is imposed utilizing
Rule 22(e) to reach the issue, the trial court is free to impose a harsher sentence. In fact,
the state fails to point to any language in either the rule or the statute that supports its
claim that after a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner is vacated on appeal
under Rule 22(e), the sentencing court is free to impose an even harsher sentence.
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Moreover, precluding imposition of harsher sentence after a defendant
successfully appeals under Rule 22(e) the manner in which sentence was imposed,
furthers the goal of preserving the right to appeal. It also ensures that defendants receive
full and fair sentencing hearings where trial courts follow due process and statutory
requirements. Because due process and section 76-3-405 preclude the imposition of a
harsher sentence when a defendant is forced to appeal in order to receive a fair hearing,
defendants who are sentenced in an illegal manner will not be afraid to appeal and ask
for a full and fair sentencing hearing.
The state complains that allowing a defendant to challenge, under Rule 22(e), a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, but imposing the section 76-3-405 and due
process limitations at resentencing "is the best of all possible worlds for the defendant."
Pet. Brf. at 13. Actually, it is the best approach for fairness and the integrity of the
system. Not just the defendant, but the state as well, should be concerned that trial courts
comply with due process and relevant statutes and rules when sentencing criminal
defendants. When a trial court imposes a sentence in an illegal manner, justice and
fairness require that the defendant be able to challenge the sentence and ask for a fair
hearing without fear of reprisal. Rule 22(e) recognizes the importance of ensuring that
sentences are imposed in a lawful manner by allowing the correction of a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner at any time. The policy behind the due process and section
76-3-405 limitations on resentencing after a defendant successfully appeals is well served
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to impose a harsher sentence after a defendant utilizes Rule 22(e) to correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner would undercut the efficacy of Rule 22(e).

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court violated due process
and section 76-3-405 in imposing a harsher sentence after Mr. Samora successfully
appealed the manner in which the original sentence was imposed. Mr. Samora
respectfully requests that this Court uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Manuel Samora respectfully requests that this Court uphold the
decision of the Court of Appeals and vacate his sentence.
SUBMITTED this J/"* day of July, 2003.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

JOHN K. WEST
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:
Joan C„„ Watt and John K West, Salt Lake City, for Appellant,
Mark I Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
1J1 Manuel Ernesto Samora (Defendant) appeals from a sentence for attempted joyriding with intent to temporarily
deprive owner, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314 (1998) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-4-10 1 (1999), Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in imposing a harsher sentence following reversal
of his original sentence on appeal. We vacate Defendant's sentence and remand.
BACKGROt INC)
f[2 On August 8, 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful control of a motor vehicle with intent to
temporarily deprive owner. As part of his plea agreement with the State, Defendant agreed to pay restitution to
the victim The trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and agreed to release him on his own recognizance
pending sentencing. The trial court set sentencing for September 22, 2000, in front of a different trial judge. Wheii
Defendant failed to appear for his September 22 sentencing, the trial court sentenced him in absentia to the
statutory maximum one-year sentence, imposed a fine of $2500, a surcharge, and attorney fees The trial couit
did not impose restitution.

P Defendant appealed his sentence in absentia, claiming it violated due process and Rule 22(a) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure On September 7, 2001, this court in a per curiam opinion vacated Defendant's
sentence and remanded his case for resentencing in accordance with State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31
P 3d 615, cert granted, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) W
1J4 On November 16, 2001, Defendant appeared for resentencing before the judge who previously sentenced him
During resentencing, defense counsel requested that the trial court waive or substantially reduce Defendant's fine
so Defendant could pay the restitution that he originally agreed to as part of the plea negotiation Defense counsel
also requested that Defendant be granted credit for the six months he had served on his sentence awaiting the
original appellate disposition
fl5 After taking testimony regarding the restitution amount owing, the trial court resentenced Defendant to the
maximum one-year jail term, denying Defendant good-time credit for the six months he had served The court
again imposed the maximum $2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees In addition, the court ordered that
Defendant pay $744 80 in restitution
1J6 Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence asking the trial court to reconsider its denial of credit for time
served The trial court granted Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and gave him credit for the time he had served
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
fl7 Defendant claims the trial court erred by imposing restitution at resentencing when restitution was not imposed
as part of Defendant's original sentence Because sentencing errors involve questions of law, we review for
correctness See State v Kenison, 2000 UT App 322,^7, 14 P 3d 129
ANALYSIS
1J8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it imposed restitution at resentencing without waiving or
substantially reducing the fine Defendant owed He contends that due process and Utah Code Ann § 76-3-405
(1999), preclude the imposition of a harsher sentence after a case is reversed on appeal The State argues that
Defendant invited any sentencing error when he declared his obligation to pay restitution Alternatively, the State
asserts that the trial court may increase the penalties upon resentencing when the original sentence was illegal or
is based on facts not known to the court at the time of the original sentencing ®
U9 In North Carolina v Pearce, 395 U S 711, 725, 89 S Ct 2072, 2080 (1969), the Supreme Court held that
when resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the sentencing judge from increasing the sentence when
that increase is motivated by vindictiveness To free defendants from the apprehension of such a retaliatory
motivation, the Supreme Court held that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant,"
the reasons must affirmatively appear on the record and "be based upon objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding " ld_
at 766, 89 S Ct at 2081 ButseeTexasv McCullough, 475 U S 140, 142, 106 S Ct 976, 980-81 (1986) (stating
that language "[Restricting justifications for a sentence increase to only 'events that occurred subsequent to the
original proceeding'" was not "intended to describe exhaustively all of the possible circumstances in which a
sentence increase could be justified")
1J10 The Utah Code also addresses limitations on resentencing, as follows
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the
same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence
previously satisfied
(2) This section does not apply when
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to the court at the

time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the record the facts
which provide the basis for the increased sentence;
I (tall i Code -Ar u i. § i: 6 3 105.
f| I il In State v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 179, 130 (Utah 1981), the supreme court discussed the requirements of due
process and section 78-3-405 in relation to resentencing., The supreme court held that section 76-3-405
prevents the Utah constitutional i ight to appeal (Article VIII, § 9) from being impaired "by imposing
on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with
a harsher sentence for havinc A^nt=> ^o "
Id (quoting Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2c

- '

4? (Utah 1980)),

In the context of the due p*
,....^nent of hortn CaLPJinaj/^Pearce, [395 L. , " ; ,•2072], which seeks to assu - .. nere is no chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant '•:
exercise of his basic constitutional right to appeal, and in light of the Utah constitutional constraint
against impairing the right to appeal, as articulated in Chess v. Smith, [617 P.2d 341], we think the
meaning of our statutory prohibition against a "more severe" second sentence is clear. The second
sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect in the number of its elements U.C A
1953, § 76-3-201, or in their magnitude.
Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181 (alterations in original),
H12 Our supreme court has also observed that section 76-3-405 is "more stringent than the due process
protection [and] "allows for no exceptions."' State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,^73, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting Sorensen,
639 P.2d at 180). Although the State agrees that as a general rule a sentence imposed after a successful appeal
cannot be more severe than the prior sentence, it argues that Defendant's case is different because he invited
any erroi by volunteering that he owed restitution,
TJ13 Defendant acknowledges he did i jot argue at resentencif ig tl iat the trial court was precluded from imposing a
harsher sentence on resentencing. However, Defendant asserts plain error on appeal. The State counters, and
our dissenting colleague agrees, that Defendant invited error by initiating the discussion of restitution and
acknowledging that it was owed. Accordingly, the State asserts that a plain error analysis is not available. See
State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct App„ 1991) (stating invited error defeats claim of plain error). We
have two initial responses. First, as noted in Wanosik, rule 22(e) permits this court to consider whether a
defendant was illegally sentenced '"even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.'" State v. Wanosik, 2001
UT App 241 ,U28 n.11, 31 P.3d 615, cert, granted, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002) (quoting State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d
856, 860 (Utah 1995)). Second, the colloquy between the trial court and Defendant's counsel lacked si ifficient
clarity to construe it as an invitation or stipulation for the trial court to violate section 76-3-405.®
^]14 We acknowledge that Defendant did not provide a plain error analysis in his brief, alluding to it only in the
standard of review section, perhaps relying on the proposition stated in Wanosik and Brooks, that the issue did
not need to be preserved in the trial court. As noted in the dissenting opinion, plain error will be found only if the
appellant establishes that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful
" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) The third factor is clearly established
because Defendant received a more harsh sentence on resentencing. We next examine the first factor, whether
error occurred, because that analysis is necessary to a plain error evaluation and also necessary if we have
jurisdiction under Wanosik and Brooks. We note that this issue is addressed in Defendant's brief
fl15 We begin our analysis by determining whether the presumptioi» u* vinuictiveiless as described in Pearce is
applicable. See Pearce. 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S. Ct. at 2080; State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). The
State argues that the principles underlying Pearce are not applicable in this case because Defendant's original
sentence was illegal, and under Babbel, id. at 88, an illegal sentence is void and not subject to the sentence
protections articulated in Pearce, Sorensen, Chess, and section 76-3-405. However, we find the State's reliance
on Babbel to be misplaced.

1J16 In Babbel, the defendant was sentenced to a term less than the applicable statute's minimum mandatory
requirements 819 P 2d at 86 The supreme court concluded that the principles underlying Pearce, Sorensen,
Chess, and section 76-3-405 did not apply because a defendant is unlikely to appeal a sentence that is unlawfully
lenient, so there is a "minimal chilling effect on the right to appeal" Id at 88 Unlike Babbel, Defendant's
resentencing did not result from an original sentence contrary to statutory minimum mandatory requirements
Rather, Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he was sentenced in absentia The sentence itself
was not illegal, but the manner in which it was imposed was contrary to law Furthermore, allowing a harsher
sentence when the original sentence was imposed in an illegal manner would have a "chilling effect on the right to
appeal," id_, and impair the Utah Constitution's guaranty of the right to appeal See Sorenson, 639 P 2d at 181
Therefore, because Babbel is not applicable, we conclude that the due process discussion in Pearce, Sorensen,
and Chess require us to apply a presumption of vindictiveness Accordingly, we next consider whether the
presumption is successfully rebutted ^
fl17 During resentencing the following colloquy took place
DEFENSE COUNSEL [Mr Samora] would like the Court to be aware of some of the things that he's
been doing while he's been incarcerated He served two months in jail before he was sentenced
originally on this case and then he served an additional approximately four months, I think, sinceMR SAMORA Six Six months
DEFENSE COUNSEL Six months And it would be~
THE COURT While you were pursuing the appeal?
DEFENSE COUNSEL Yes, your Honor
THE COURT Yeah Well, I mean, the point is, I guess, made
DEFENSE COUNSEL [l]t would be my request on behalf of Mr Samora that the Court do a couple
of things One, that the Court would waive the fine There is some restitution owing that was part of
the negotiation in this case to the victim
Mr Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly longterm relationship before this all happened and there was, as part of the negotiation, he's to pay
some restitution with respect to that
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the
Court give him credit for time served on this case
THE COURT All right Thank you
1118 After receiving the victim's testimony regarding the amount of restitution owed, the trial judge imposed the
maximum one-year sentence, $2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees The court also ordered Defendant to
pay $744 80 in restitution, without any reduction in the fine, as Defendant had requested The trial judge initially
denied Defendant's request for credit for the six months he had already served on his one-year sentence, but
relented after Defendant filed his Motion to Reconsider Sentence
1{19 The State argues that although Defendant "may have hoped for a reduction in his fine," the record does not
indicate that his agreement to pay restitution was conditioned on such a reduction However, after reading the
sentencing proceeding transcript in context, it is apparent that Defendant was asking the trial court to waive or
substantially reduce his fine so that Defendant could instead pay restitution It is unreasonable to believe that
Defendant volunteered to assume responsibility for restitution, which if imposed would substantially increase the
monetary amount of Defendant's sentence, on the mere hope that his fine would be waived or reduced
Furthermore, given extant case law and section 76-3-405, Defendant was not required to submit to a restitution
order as part of resentencing, nor was the trial court empowered to order the same Given the record we have
before us, we cannot conclude that the presumption of vindictiveness has been rebutted Therefore, error

occurred because Defendant received a harsher sentence after exercising his constitutional right to appeal his
original sentence,,
1120 The State, howevei , also ai gues that Defendai it's harsher sentet ice vi as appi opriate ui idei Utal i Code Ai 11 i. §
76-3-405(2)(a), which allows for an increased sentence when it is "based 01 i facts which were not known to the
court at the time of the original sentence." The State argues that because the trial judge did not review the record,
which included Defendant's obligation to pay restitution, before originally sentencing Defendant, the prohibition
against a harsher sentence does not apply. We disagree
1J21 I he record discloses that restitution was discussed at Defendants plea hearing. In addition, the record
includes the "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and Order," signed by Defendant, in which he
agrees to pay restitution. The State cannot claim that the facts regarding restitution were unknown at the time of
the original sentencing because the trial judge did not review the record before sentencing Defendant. A trial
judge, like every other party to a proceeding, is charged with knowledge of what is in the record. Therefore, the
trial judge's failure to familiarize himself with the record in this case does not satisfy the lack of knowledge
requirement found in section 76-3-405. Furthermore, as noted in the per curiam opinion vacating Defendant's
original sentence, the trial court at the original sentencing did not provide an opportunity for Defendant's counsel
or the State to provide any information relevant to sentencing. See State v. Samora, 2001 I IT App 266 (per
curiam).
1J22 Having concluded that error occurred, we now turn to whether "the error should have been obvious to the trial
court." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Section 76-3-405, federal case law, Bakalov, and Sorenson clearly prohibit a
harsher sentence on resentencing absent specific circumstances. The trial court did not address nor specify any
basis for deviating from that mandate. Therefore, the error should have been recognized by the trial court,
CONCLUSION
1J23 We conclude that we have jurisdiction in this case despite Defendant's failure to preserve the issues before
the trial court because the trial court illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing. Alternatively, there was
plain error in imposing sentence. Given the record before us, we conclude that the presumption of vindictiveness
or retaliation has not been rebutted and Defendant received a harsher sentence on resentencing in derogation of
section 76-3-405 and principles of due process. Therefore, we reverse and remand for sentencing in accordance
with this opinion. At resentencing, the restitution order must be eliminated, or at Defendant's option and with the
trial court's agreement, the fine may be reduced by the amount of restitution.

Pamela T. Greenwood, ludge

1124 I CONCUR:

Norman H Jackson,
Presiding Judge

BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
IP'

I

MI

lllliii, i

rl

s^

nun

In i i l i f f i HhMiill

111

in ill

1f26 Judge Robin W. Reese took Defendants piea
victim, his former girlfriend. Sentencing was th •
failed to appear for sentencing, Judge Freder.^,, _

at proceeding, Defendant agreed to pay restitution to the
ed before Judge J. Dennis Frederick. When Defendant
™d him in absentia. No sentencing information was

presented at that proceeding, and Judge Frederick imposed the maximum jail time and fine On the first appeal,
this court reversed Defendant's sentence in accordance with State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P 3d 615,
cert granted, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) We then remanded the case for resentencing
H27 At the resentencing hearing, Defendant appeared and affirmatively asserted that, under his plea agreement,
he owed restitution He said he owed about $900, maybe "a little higher," although the victim testified that $744 80
would cover her losses Judge Frederick ordered Defendant to pay the lesser sum in restitution, plus the
maximum jail time and fine Apparently, Defendant had hoped that he would be ordered to pay just the restitution
and no fine Defendant's attorney made the following statement to the court
It
would be my request on behalf of Mr Samora that the Court do a couple of things One, that
the Court would waive the fine There is some restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in
this case to the victim They've-Mr Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-term
relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of the negotiation, [an agreement] to
pay some restitution with respect to that
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the
Court give him credit for time served on this case
1J28 Defendant never claimed below that the imposition of restitution, in addition to the fine, would violate due
process or Utah Code Ann § 76-3-405 (1999) Because Defendant did not raise this issue below, we are
precluded from addressing it unless Defendant can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain
error occurred See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 741J11, 10 P 3d 346 On appeal, Defendant mentions plain error in
reciting what he believes to be the applicable standard of review, but does not even purport to demonstrate how
the trial court plainly erred We, therefore are precluded from addressing the issue
1129 We would be precluded from addressing the issue even if Defendant had articulated a plain error argument
on appeal "To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that '(i) an error exists, (n) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court, and (m) the error is harmful"' State v Pecht 2002 UT 41.H18, 48 P 3d 931
(quoting State v Dunn, 850 P 2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)) Plain error, however, can never be urged when the
appellant affirmatively invites the court's ruling See State v Perdue, 813 P 2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct App 1991)
(stating that "where invited error butts up against manifest injustice [or plain error], the invited error rule prevails")
"The doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on
appeal'" ld_ at 1205 (citation omitted) Otherwise, a criminal defendant could invite prejudicial error and "implant it
in the record as a form of appellate insurance
" State v Parsons, 781 P 2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) In this
case, Defendant affirmatively raised the issue of restitution and agreed that restitution was owing He did not
claim that, if restitution were ordered, he had a due process or statutory entitlement to a reduction in the fine
Given how he invited the court to impose restitution, Defendant is now in no position to challenge it on appeal
See Perdue, 813 P 2d at 1205
1J30 Even if we could properly reach the merits of Defendant's contention on appeal, the argument fails because
the first sentence had no legal effect At resentencing, the trial court was therefore not limited by the terms of the
first sentence See State v Babbel, 813 P 2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) (stating that '"[t]he rule followed by most
jurisdictions is that an unlawful sentence is of no legal effect, allowing the court to correct the sentence by
imposing lawful terms at any time the illegality is discovered, regardless of whether the correction involves an
increase'") (quoting Annotation, Power of Court to Increase Severity of Unlawful Sentence-Modern Status, 28
A L R 4th 147, 152(1984))
H31 The mam opinion is wrong in trying to distinguish this case from Babbel In Babbel, the Utah Supreme Court
cited the statute that preceded rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for the proposition that the trial
court can '"correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time '" Babbel, 813
P 2d at 87 (citation omitted) The supreme court stated that "[t]he correction of an illegal sentence stands on a
different footing from the correction of an error in a conviction " Id at 88 Therefore, the court held that "the
principles underlying" the cases holding that federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from being
imposed in a second trial for the same offense after a reversal of the first conviction, "have no application [to t]he
correction of an illegal sentence " Id

1J32 The initial sentence ii i the present case was illegal because it was improperly imposed in Defendant's
absence. That was precisely how the first appeal was argued. When we remanded the case, we expressly noted
that the court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. See SMe y,__SamoxaJ 2001 UT App 266 at n.1 (per
curiam) (unpublished mem. decision) (referring to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)). My colleagues cannot now change
course and hold that a sentence imposed contrary to law is not an illegal sentence. Rule 22(e) itself treats equally
"an illegal sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Because this case
involves an illegal sentence, there can be no presumption of vindictiveness as described in NgrtJi Carolina v,
Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87-88. When it resentenced Defendant, the trial court was
therefore not limited by the terms of the prior sentence. SeejdL; see_aJso Iexas_y. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134
(1986) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982), for the proposition that "[n]othing in the
Constitution requires a judge to ignore 'objective inforrnatioi i
ji istifying the increased sentence'").
1133

Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Wanosik held that due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) require a trial court to conduct
adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Defendant's absence before proceeding to sentence in absentia.
2001 UT App 241,1137-38, 31 P.3d 615.
2. Hie burden is on the State to establish that Defendant's harsher sentence did not violate the requirements of
due process and section 76-V405 SeeNorth Carolina_v._Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726, 89 S. Ct 2072, 2081 (1969).
3. We discuss the colloqi ly i* :~ '^e n^\^\ i.res -r
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4. I he State's brief does not address the Pearce presumption of vii u,
original sentencing court did not know about restitution agreed to in i:.w ,
restitution at resentencing was necessarily nonretaliatory.
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ADDENDUM B

'Jin I illlii. Limitation on sentence

prior sentence set aside.
(1) W here a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new" sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously
satisfied.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to
the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively
places on the record the facts which provide the basis for the increased
sentence; or
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and
later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which case the
defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position as though the
plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall bp not less t h a n two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of t h e defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds t h a t a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a w a r r a n t for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the c-'iirt.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, a t any time.
ff) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter J6a. Utah ('ode If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202< 1Kb), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 191)5, J a n u a r y 1, 1996.)

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 001906887 FS

MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

e < rU

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
September 22, 2000

103075
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OFJUDGMENTS

PRESENT

Clerk:
cindyb
Prosecutor: MURPHY, J KEVIN
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K

DATE

Q-cte-an

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 21, 1958
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 9:25-9:27
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR (amended) Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/2000 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/
INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.

Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment

Case No: 001906887
Date:
Sep 22, 2000

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$2500.00
$0.00
$2119 . 05
$4619.05
$2500.00
$0
$2119.05
$4619.05
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Pay fine to The Court.
The Court finds defendant voluntarily absented himself from
sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in
absentia. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings and order.
Defendant to be committed forthwith upon his arrest on this
Court's bench warrant
Dated this

REDERIC
urt Jud<

Page 2 (last]
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—00O00—

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Manuel Ernesto Samora,
Defendant and Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No 20000884-CA
FILED
September 7, 2001
|l 2001 UTApp266 [|

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J Dennis Frederick
Attorneys
Joan C Watt and John K West, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L Shurtleff, Jeanne B Inouye, and Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme
PER CURIAM
Appellant Manuel Ernesto Samora appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Joyriding, a class A
misdemeanor
The issues raised in Samora's appeal are the same issues determined in State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,
428 Utah Adv Rep 10, regarding sentencing in absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(a) and Due Process rights Accordingly, Samora is entitled to be resentenced under Wanosik
because the district court did not (1) make an adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Samora's absence
before proceeding to sentence him in absentia, (2) provide Samora the opportunity to present information through
counsel in mitigation of punishment and also provide the prosecutor an opportunity to present information relevant
to sentencing, and (3) base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information regarding the crime,
defendant's background, and the interests of society See id at ffl]36-38
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal
defendant who is a fugitive may be dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the jurisdiction
and if the State cannot demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by reinstatement See, e g , State v Tuttle, 713 P 2d
703, 705 (Utah 1985) Because Wanosik is dispositive of Samora's appeal and requires a remand for
resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal (11 However, if Samora appeals the sentence imposed after

remand, the State may raise the dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal
We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Wanosik

Pamela T Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Judith M Billings, Judge

Gregory K Orme, Judge
1 Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Samora could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure See Utah R Crim P 22(e) ("The court may correct
a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time "), see also Wanosik, 241 UT App 241 at n 11 (stating issues regarding
illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e))
Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal from the sentence and preserve the State's ability to seek
dismissal in any appeal taken after resentencing
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
AMENDED SENTENCE, JUDGMENT,
COMMITMENT
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001906887 FS

MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

jfc*

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
November 16, 2 001

lo^lS
ENTERED IN P I C ! "TRY
OFJUpQr./.^N/TS

PRESENT

Clerk:
cindyb
Prosecutor: ESQUEDA, CARLOS A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K

DATE

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 21, 1958
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 9:54-10:02
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR (amended)
Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/2000 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/
INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Commitment is to begin immediately.
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Case No: 001906887
Date:
Nov 16, 2001

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Credit for time served is granted originally awaiting disposition
in this case. No credit will be given after warrant was issued and
defendant arrested.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$2119.05
$4619.05
$2500.00
$0
$2119.05
$4619.05
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Restitution:
Dated this

Amount: $744.80

k

day of

Page 2 (last)
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Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107. 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himself from sentencing is
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App.
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) ( recognizing trial
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error).
Preservation. Although defense counsel was not given an opportunity to speak, the
trial court nevertheless considered the issue of whether it was appropriate to proceed, and
concluded that Appellant had voluntarily absented himself (R. 64:2). A copy of the
sentencing transcript is in Addendum B. The trial court also entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, a copy of which is in Addendum C (R. 44-45). In fact, although the
parties were never given the opportunity to address the issue of whether proceeding in
absentia was appropriate under the circumstances of the case, the prosecutor was able to
2

prepare findings and conclusions on that issue (R. 64:2). Because the trial court
considered this issue below, it is properly preserved for appellate review. .See State v.
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989) (purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in the
trial court is to allow the trial judge to review the issue and correct an error).1
Alternatively, the trial judge committed plain error in proceeding in absentia and in
failing to base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information without
affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah
R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs
when an error is obvious and prejudices the defendant). Under Johnson and Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing to conduct a full sentencing hearing was obvious as
was the denial of Samora's right to presence at sentencing pursuant to Article I,
section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious error prejudiced Samora since he received the
maximum sentence when he otherwise was a candidate for probation; see discussion infra
at 11.

1

The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow trial counsel the
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and
defendant is convicted, claiming error. Eldredge. 773 P.2d at 36; State v. Labrum. 925
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,
497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge reviewed the issue of whether to
proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings and conclusions on that issue, both
of those purposes were met. The trial court had the opportunity to review the issue and
correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed for foregoing the objection.
Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal.
3

Finally, the issue should also be reviewed because exceptional circumstances
justifying review exist in this case. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996).
Utah R. Evid. 22(a) requires a trial judge to afford defendant the opportunity to provide
relevant information at sentencing; due process requires the judge to conduct a full and
fair sentencing hearing. Where the judge does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak
and does not conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring
review exists. See id. (exceptional circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare
procedural anomalies). In addition, the question of whether the trial judge imposed legal
sentence is of widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court
raising a similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where
"matters of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist). Without appellate
review, the egregious violation of due process, Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and the right to
presence which occurred in this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial
judge had the obligation to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so,
exceptional circumstances require that this Court review the issue on appeal.
Issue 2. Whether Appellant waived his right to appeal by failing to appear at
sentencing.
Preservation. The state raised this issue in its response to this Court's sua sponte
motion for summary disposition. This Court ordered that this issue be considered as part
of the plenary review of this case. See Addendum D.
4
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Thomas C Headley,
Defendant and Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No 990462-CA
FILED
February 28, 2002
ll 2002 UT App 58 |[

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Tyrone Medley
Attorneys
Edward R Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thome
JACKSON, Presiding Judge
Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure He contends the district court erred in ruling that his motion did
"not attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed " Headley's
contention is two-fold (1) his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, and (2) the sentencing court
relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false We affirm
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that we review for correctness, see State v Brooks, 908
P 2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995), State v Patience, 944 P 2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct App 1997), and we can affirm
the decision "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record " State v Fmlayson, 2000
UT 10,H31, 994 P 2d 1243 Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing when a
sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner" Utah R Cnm P 22(e) The definition of an "illegal sentence"
has been construed narrowly to include only sentences "where the sentence does not conform to the crime of
which the defendant has been convicted " ^ State v Parker, 872 P 2d 1041, 1043 n 2 (Utah Ct App 1994) Utah
law has no comprehensive definition of sentences "imposed in an illegal manner", however, the Utah Supreme
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing (2) See Kuehnertv Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P 2d 839, 841
(1975) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at sentencing, was

not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his
Sixth Amendment rights) £) In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at
sentencing is necessary
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement
of penal laws
l i at 840-41 Ml
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of his Sixth
Amendment right To support his claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows (1) he asserts that his
challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report was rejected by the sentencing court because
it was poorly handled by sentencing counsel, (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the
presentence investigation report, (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused him of being involved in incest
when that information was not otherwise before the court", and (4) he asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel
convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]" Each of these four
assertions has some connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal
Further, no other information in the record supports these assertions Accordingly, as discussed below, we are
unable to address them
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without objection by his
counsel We find no mention of a $10,000 fine in the record The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three days later Finally, Headley alleges that "his
counsel intentionally tried to prevent him from pursuing an appeal" However, the record reflects that Headley filed
a notice of appeal on September 24,1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty " Headley's motion was granted on October 8, 1992, and the record contains no
indication of subsequent attempts to appeal the case
Without the presentence report or other information which may or may not be in the sentencing court record, the
record submitted to us is inadequate for our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim All we have are
Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct As we have stated,
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of
supporting such allegation by an adequate record Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine [An
appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record Consequently, in the face of an [inadequate record on appeal, [we]
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below
State v Penman, 964 P 2d 1157, 1162 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original),
see also State v Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1117, 12 P 3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel
performed effectively ") Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was biased because it relied on information in the presentence report
that the court knew was false Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1(6) (Supp 2001) gives a sentencing judge discretion in
evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge to "make a determination of relevance and
accuracy on the record " Here, the sentencing judge made a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the
presentence report, deciding the presentence report was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating that those
working on elements of the presentence report "do a pretty good job " The sentencing court has broad discretion
to resolve factual disputes for or against a defendant, see id , and we cannot say the court exceeded its discretion
in making this determination Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and M,[we] must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below '" Penman, 964 P 2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in
original)

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing

Norman H Jackson,
Presiding Judge

I CONCUR

William A Thome Jr, Judge

GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result)
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but would affirm on what I perceive to be a more straightforward
basis As stated by the majority, the trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not
attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed " The trial court
was correct
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e) Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding otherwise and has also not
offered any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case See State v Thomas, 961 P 2d 299,
305 (Utah 1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on [cited] authority") The sentence imposed was
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial court properly resolved factual disputes presented to it
Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal
manner" Utah R Cnm P 22(e) On that basis, I would affirm

Pamela T Greenwood, Judge
1 Nonconforming sentences include those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits See, e g , State v
Higginbotham, 917 P 2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because statute only
authorized one year enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years), State v Patience, 944 P 2d
381, 388 (Utah Ct App 1997) (noting that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term)
Nonconforming sentences also occur when the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence See, e g , State
v Hurst, 777 P 2d 1029, 1036 n 6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court), State v Arviso, 1999 UT App 381,1ffi5-8, 993 P 2d 894 (stating that the
sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived sentencing court of jurisdiction), State v Grate, 947
P 2d 1161, 1168 (Utah Ct App 1997) (stating that the sentence was illegal because court did not have
jurisdiction to revoke probation)
2 Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights, see, e g , Government of the V I v Martinez, 239 F 3d 293,
299 n 3 (3rd Cir 2001), State v McNeills, 546 A 2d 292, 305-06 (Conn Ct App 1988), State v Sieler, 554
N W2d 447, 479 (S D 1996), cf State v Anderson, 661 P 2d 716, 720-24 (Haw Ct App 1983), State v Brooks.
589 A 2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991), or that are based on erroneous information See, e g , United States v Katzin,

824 F.2d 234, 238 (3rd Cir. 1987).
3. Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sentences under the rules in force prior to Rule 22(e), was not cited in the
parties' briefs.
4. See also McConnell v. Rhay. 393 U.S. 2, 4, 89 S. Ct. 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we said in Mempa[ v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 135, 88 S. Ct. 254, 257 (1967)], 'the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances!,] and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to
sentence is apparent.' The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at
other stages of adjudication." (Citation omitted.)).

